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FOREWORD
The Red Line rapid transit line of the MBTA is an indispensable part of
the transportation network linking Boston and its neighbors to the south and
northwest. Total gridlock has not occurred on the roadways in those
transportation corridors only because of the many commuters who "ride the
T." Each weekday during the morning and evening peak periods, the Red Line
serves more travellers than can be accommodated on all of the highways
which parallel its course. To these 95,000 people who use the Red Line on an
average weekday, it is an object of great concern. But, the Red Line also is
clearly a vital resource to everyone in its service area and its performance
and future capabilities affect us all.
That was one reason the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight
decided to assess MBTA Red Line performance. An additional reason was
found in the need for the Red Line to provide future service to a significant
number of new riders if the planned Third Harbor Tunnel and Central Artery
construction projects are to be completed without severe disruptions to and
dislocation of Boston area businesses and jobs.
Overall, the Committee found that the MBTA has done many of the
things necessary to making the Red Line an effective, reliable method of
public transport. Stations have been modernized with many platforms
lengthened to accommodate six-car trains. Track, switch and signal problems
are being addressed. The 74 car Silverbird fleet has been completely rebuilt,
and the procurement of 58 new cars is becoming a reality. The number of
"runs" completed has steadily improved, as has, in the Committee's opinion,
the overall service and performance of this transit line.
All of these accomplishments are welcome and provide a basis for future
optimism. Nevertheless, there are still areas which concern this Committee.
The number of trips cancelled because of equipment failure went up in 1987
as, in some time periods of 1987, did the number of trains which had to be
taken out of service during peak hours because of disablement. While this
may be attributable to the age of many of the cars which form a significant
part of the available fleet, it is enough to prompt the Committee
to urge the Authority to make fleet reliability a priority, and to vigorously
pursue its goal of purchasing new cars to replace the most vulnerable part of
its current rapid transit fleet. The Committee believes improved reliability
will mean both improved actual service, and improved rider perception of that
service ... a key to Red Line acceptability.
The Committee is fearful that plans for the Red Line serving a
significant number of new patrons will never become a reality unless the
MBTA is successful in its efforts to improve rider acceptance and to increase
parking capacity at or near the Red Line stations on its various branches. At
present, nearly all parking facilities are at capacity before the morning rush
hour ends, thus discouraging Red Line use by current potential riders as well
as potential future users. If people are to be tempted, cajoled or coerced off
the major roads into Boston, they must have an accessible, usable alternative.
If parking access to Red Line stations is not provided, the Red Line's service
as a substitute for car travel or a relief valve for future traffic congestion is
mere wishful thinking.
The Committee may go a bit against prevalent expressed opinion when it
states that it believes Red Line service has improved in many respects, with
more improvements underway. But, through its research, it is convinced that
MBTA management has recognized past problems with the line, and has acted
reasonably and persistently to correct those problems. Many of the remaining
problems and future challenges of the Red Line are beyond the direct control
of the MBTA management, but it is attempting to secure the resources and
cooperation needed for it to successfully address and meet those challenges
and concerns. The Committee hopes that this analysis of the Red Line's past
and present performance and future plans will assist all involved in reaching a
good understanding of the needs and necessity of Red Line transit service and
the prompt resolution of remaining concerns.
Sincerely,
LOUIS P. BERTONAZZT Q
*
J
Chairman
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In November, 1987, the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight
commenced a limited performance audit of the Red Line rapid transit line.
This line was chosen for review because it is a crucial part of the
transportation network undergirding the economic and social life of Boston
and its neighbors to both the south and the northwest. In addition, the
Executive Office of Transportation and Construction has nominated the MBTA
as the main weapon for easing traffic snarls and other disruptions during the
construction phases of the massive highway projects planned for the downtown
Boston area over the next decade. The Committee wanted to determine
whether it is reasonable to expect the MBTA, and the Red Line in particular,
to provide this additional service without fatally straining its operational
capacity.
A complete description of the Red Line is presented in this report as is an
analysis of the patrons using the Red Line on weekdays. This analysis is
important since it discloses a significant number of regular Red Line riders
who could reach their destination by driving if they so chose. The Committee
is convinced that if, for whatever reason, any notable number of these
"voluntary" Red Line riders were to abandon rapid transit in favor of their
cars, everyone's trip to, through, and out of Boston's central business district
would be substantially more chaotic than it is at present, if it were possible at
all. That heightened the Committee's concern about Red Line performance.
The Committee reviewed Red Line performance during 1986 and 1987
because most of the "Silverbird" fleet had been rebuilt by the end of 1987.
The Committee wanted to determine whether the rebuilding efforts by the
Authority resulted in improved performance. Data reviewed by the
Committee indicated that 1986 performance was better than performance in
1985 and prior years and was interested in knowing if the improvement trend
was sustained. The data submitted indicated that for the most part the
i -
Authority was reaching or exceeding its operational goal in 1987 of
maintaining a throughput level (the actual number of trains that pass a
particular "check" point) of between 98 and 100 percent. As an additional
performance measure, the Committee asked staff to do a limited field study
to assess Red Line ability to maintain established schedules and headways. It
found that during the five rush hours monitored, the Red Line performed on or
close to schedule.
Other performance measures reviewed were less positive. A comparison
of the scheduled runs cancelled or interrupted during the first eleven months
of 1986 and 1987 showed that the number of cancellations caused by
mechanical failure en route increased 22 percent in 1987. Moreover, when the
Committee compared the number of disabled trains taken out of service
during May to November of 1986 and 1987, it found that the number rose from
625 to 682, an increase of 9 percent. However, a much lower breakdown rate
in November, 1987, may indicate that improved maintenance and a growing
fleet of new or rebuilt cars will reverse the situation.
In spite of some negative results, the Committee did find that in recent
years the Authority has made significant efforts to upgrade the physical
facilities of the Red Line and believes that management of the Authority has
made a consistent commitment to improving the day-to-day performance of
the line. It was clear that a shortage of reliable cars strained the ability of
the Authority to provide prompt and effective service in past years. The
MBTA was striving to complete its purchase of 58 new rapid transit cars while
it also pursued a program of rebuilding its older "Silverbird" fleet. This dual
effort strained those vehicles remaining in service.
The Committee commends the Authority for initiating a preventative
maintenance program during 1986. Although the agency has not achieved all
that can be expected from an aggressive and positive maintenance program, it
was clear that its approach toward prevention is now well established. The
Committee believes that strict adherence to the established maintenance
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program is the key to present and future Red Line fleet reliability and urges
the Authority to put maintenance and reliability at the top of its list of
priorities, even if that means that the deployment of full six-car train service
must be delayed for a time.
With its purchase of new cars and its lengthened stations, the Authority
will have a greatly increased passenger load capacity. During rush hours, the
Red Line will be able to transport, under moderately crowded conditions,
about 58,000 passengers each way. In very crowded conditions, a maximum of
74,300 passengers can be accommodated. These figures substantially exceed
present Red Line demand and dwarf the capacity of the highways which
parallel its route. Therefore, there is little doubt that the Red Line has the
potential to absorb a large number of new patrons.
However, the Committee is most concerned that the potential will never
be realized because of the lack of parking capacity at or near the Red Line
routes. Committee data indicates that almost all parking lots on the line
reach capacity before the morning rush period ends. The Authority has
recognized the problem and is working toward a solution. The Committee
recognizes that the agency needs and deserves full cooperation from both
state and local officials in this quest if it is to provide a safety valve for the
overcrowded, congested roadways into Boston.
Finally, because "No.5" cars represent almost 75% of the trains presently
being taken out of service due to mechanical problems, the Committee urges
the Authority to proceed with replacement of the those cars without delay.
Without a commitment to new cars, the sincere efforts of the management
and staff of the Authority to restore this line to an acceptable level of
performance may be squandered because of an unreliable fleet. That in turn
will lessen needlessly the practical value of the three quarters of a billion
dollars already invested in improving this vital transportation resource.
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I. Introduction
Several considerations prompted the Senate Committee on Post Audit and
Oversight's review of the performance of the Red Line Rapid Transit Line of
the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. First is the fact that the
Red Line is a crucial element of the public transportation network which
undergirds the economic and social life of Boston and its neighbors. As such,
it not only serves Boston and its neighborhoods, but also provides a link-up
between communities south of Boston and those to the northwest which can be
as much as 100 miles apart.
The second factor triggering Committee interest is the fact that the Red
Line serves two distinct transportation corridors whose streets and arteries
have already reached their daily practical capacity, specifically the
Expressway, Central Artery, and 1-93 connections. For those who must use
these roads, all-day traffic jams are a daily burden. For many, the only viable
alternative to congested roadways is the Red Line. Indeed the Committee is
convinced that the only thing presently forestalling total gridlock on these
roads is the willingness of thousands of travelers to use public transportation.
If the current public transportation users reverted to driving, the roads would
be literally impassable. There is that interdependence between drivers and
transit users which the Committee wishes to examine and highlight.
Moreover, just as when it reviewed the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
in August of 1987, the Committee has compelling concern about the effect on
area transportation of the Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel Project. The
Executive Office of Transportation and Construction has nominated the MBTA
as the state's main weapon to ease traffic snarls and disruptions during that
planned construction. This nomination means that the Red Line and its
patrons will be asked to play an important role in the record breaking
construction project. And, this contribution is being asked before it is
determined that the past, well chronicled problems of this rapid transit line
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are behind it. This is a strategy which the Committee questions. In the
Committee's view, it is more reasonable to first determine whether the Red
Line's past failures have been remedied and then, and only then, consider the
feasibility of an added role for the line in the future.
Committee confidence in this policy of viewing the Red Line as a partial
solution to the as yet unspecified projected snarls of the artery project was
not increased by the release in October, 1987 of an MBTA Advisory Board
critique of Red Line performance on six selected days during the previous
month. Among its findings, the Advisory Board reported that between
7:45a.m. and 8:15a.m. on workdays it was almost impossible to board a Boston
bound train at North Quincy, the last South Shore north bound station, and
that only two of 30 trains to Boston ran with less than a "crush load" during
the morning rush hour.
The Advisory Board further reported that much the same conditions
prevailed during the evening rush hour. Passengers were subjected to the
same delays and overcrowding. On all six days of observation, three trains
between 4:30p.m. and 6:00p.m. ran 10 to 18 minutes apart despite the fact that
the schedule called for a headway of only 8 1/2 minutes.
On November 24, 1987, just before the Committee's decision to review
the Red Line was communicated to the Authority, MBTA management
responded to the Advisory Board's findings with its own report, a copy of
which was subsequently provided to the Committee. It outlined the facility
and service improvement program currently underway on the Red Line.
MBTA management did not deny present and past shortcomings on this line,
choosing, instead, to focus on the strides taken in the recent past to improve
service and to document its belief that the outlook for the Red Line in the
future was bright.
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A principal part of management's hope for the future is its plan to
operate six-car trains on the Red Line sometime in late 1988. This, it
believes, will add 50% to the present load capacity of the Red Line and
substantially reduce overcrowding. Management also argues that progress in
turning around this vital rapid transit line is already apparent and cites the
following:
1. The No.l South Shore vehicle rebuild program is approaching
completion and rebuilt cars are performing well in revenue service.
2. Service is improving with average throughput and vehicle availability
increasing and the number of disabled vehicles and missed trips
decreasing.
3. Power improvement and platform lengthening projects will be
completed by the end of this year, permitting the start of the six-car
train program.
4. The prototype cars from the No.2 new car procurement (58 cars
total) are in acceptance testing and the delivery of the remaining
cars is scheduled for completion in 1988.
On November 25, 1987, the Committee notified the General Manager of
the MBTA of its decision to conduct a limited performance audit of the Red
Line rapid transit line. The General Manager was advised that the committee
wanted to determine whether the Authority provides through its Red Line
service a safe, convenient, reliable and reasonably comfortable form of
transportation into and out of the work and commercial centers located along
its routes, and in a manner which "promotes the general economic and social
wellbeing of the area and the Commonwealth" M.G.L. c 161A § 5. MBTA
management was further advised that an important focus of the study was the
adequacy of access to the Red Line for those who must use and park their cars
in order to use this important service.
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H;_Th^R^d_LJ^e_ajTd_Its_PjUn^s
After what one newspaper described as a "decade of agitated debate
about public transportation", and five years of construction, the modern era of
the Red Line began when the MBTA opened the South Shore extension in
Quincy on September 2, 1971. On that day, a luxury, 2-bedroorn apartment
with utilities in Quincy Center was being advertised for $275 a month and
popular Japanese cars were being sold for under two thousand dollars. Today
the same items are being advertised for $800 and $10,000, respectively, and
the Red Line has been substantially altered, now extending to South Braintree
in the south and to Alewife Parkway, Cambridge, to the north.
A. Physical Description of the Red Line
Today, rapid transit service in the South Shore Corridor is provided by the
Dorchester Branch and the South Shore Branch of the Red Line. The
Dorchester Branch has its southern terminus at Ashmont in South Dorchester.
From Ashmont it runs through North Dorchester and South Boston. At
Columbia junction the Dorchester Branch merges with the South Shore Branch
just before entering the subway portion of the line. The distance from
Ashmont Station to Columbia junction is 2.9 miles.
The South Shore Branch of the Red Line has its southern terminus in
South Braintree. From that terminus it runs to Quincy-Adams station in South
Quincy and then through the city of Quincy before joining the Dorchester
Branch at Columbia junction in South Boston. After Columbia junction, trains
from both branches enter the subway and serve two additional stations,
Andrew and Broadway, along what is called the Red Line stem. After that the
trains continuing to downtown Boston before crossing over the Charles River
into Cambridge and continue to Alewife station in North Cambridge where
they terminate.
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The stations on the Dorchester Branch are Ashinont, Shawmut, Fields
Corner, Savin Hill and Columbia. The stations on the South Shore Branch are
South Braintree, Quincy-Adams, Quincy Center, Wollaston and North Quincy.
In addition to the two stations in the Red Line stem, Andrew and Broadway,
the line has four downtown Boston stations, namely, South Station,
Washington, Park Street and Charles. The running time from South Braintree
to Park Street is about twenty-six minutes. From Ashmont to Park Street,
the scheduled running time is about eighteen minutes.
The Red Line also provides rapid transit service in the Northwest
Corridor. From its northern terminus at Alewife Station, located at the
intersection of Route 2 and Alewife Brook Parkway in northwest Cambridge,
the Red Line runs to Porter and Davis stations, providing service to north
Cambridge and west and central Somerville. It then proceeds to Harvard
Square, then to Central Square and on to Kendall Square before crossing the
Charles River on its way to downtown Boston.
The Red Line stations in the northwest corridor are Alewife, Davis,
Porter, Harvard, Central and Kendall. Alewife station is 8.7 miles from Park
Street station in downtown Boston and the scheduled running time between
these stations is about eighteen minutes. Alewife, Davis and Porter stations
were built as part of the 5.5 mile northwest extension of the Red Line which
was finished in March, 1985. The cost of the extension, which included a new
Harvard station, was $572,000,000.
B. Red Line Patrons
Much is known about the socio/economic characteristics of the Red Line
patrons of the South Shore and Northwest extensions, chiefly because of
several studies conducted by the Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS)
before, during and after significant events affecting the operation of this
rapid transit line. The last of these studies was released as recently as
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December, 1987 and reviewed the Red Line Extension to Alewife. From these
studies important information about the commuting habits of Red Line riders
can be assembled, such as auto ownership, auto availability, age and household
income. The surveys are also valuable because they reveal how the
commuters accessed the line, where their trips originated, where they were
going, and how frequently they used the Red Line.
According to CTPS data, the typical northwest extension rider, including
those who board at Harvard, is 35 years old, lives in Cambridge, works in
Boston, uses the Red Line 3 to 4 days a week, has a car available for his or her
trip, but chooses to use the Red Line. The most affluent riders of this
extension board at Alewife, where 65% of the riders have a household income
over $30,000 and 35% have a household income of $50,000 or more. Travellers
who board at Davis are less affluent, with 65% reporting family incomes
below $30 t000. At Porter station, 62% of the riders report the lower figure.
Two-thirds of Alewife riders report that they have a car available for
their trip, but instead choose to ride the Red Line. Not surprisingly, the
riders boarding at Porter and Davis are more transit dependent, with 56% of
those at Porter reporting they did not have a car available, and only 49% of
the riders at Davis reporting the availability of a car. At least two-thirds of
those boarding at Davis and Porter stations walk to the Red Line, with the
latter patrons leading the way with a 76% rate.
Just as is the case on the Northwest extension, on the South Shore
corridor there is a significant majority of riders who use the Red Line by
choice. According to a study conducted at the opening of the Quincy-Adams
station on the South Shore extension in 1984, about 50 percent of the riders on
this branch had family incomes in excess of $30,000. And although only 8
percent indicated they did not own an automobile, a larger group, about 30%,
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indicated that they did not have a car available for the trip that day.
Nevertheless, almost 70% did indicate that an automobile was available for
the trip if it was needed.
The same 1984 passenger survey also showed that 40% of those who
boarded at Quincy Center station arrived on a bus, but that was the only
station on this extension where buses played a significant role in providing
access to the line. At Wollaston station, walking to the station was the
leading mode of access with 44% of those surveyed indicating that they
walked to the station on that date. The other stations with a significant
walking population were North Quincy with a rate of 33% and Wollaston with
a 24% rate. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the way people get to the Red
Line on its South Shore extension.
TABLE I
Mode of Ac cess
By Boarding Station
6:30-9;30 AM February 29, 1984
Quincy Quincy North
Braintree Adams Center Wollaston Quincy Total
Park and ride 1,860 1,061 649 1,352 1,397 6,318
(58%) (80%) (21%) (40%) (52%) (46%)
Kiss and ride 857 137 409 502 257 2,162
(27%) (10%) (13%) (15%) (10%) (16%)
MBTA bus 317 43 1,185 53 109 1,706
(10%) (3%) (40%) (2%) (4%) (12%)
Private bus - 30 4 34
(1%) - -
Walked 155 84 733 1,506 883 3,361
(5%) (6%) (24%) (44%) (33%) (25%)
Bicycled - 2 4 6
Other 29 2 27 26 84
(1%) - (1%) - (1%) (1%)
Total 3,218 1,328 3,033 3,413 2,681 13,672
(23%) (10%) (22%) (25%) (20%) (100%)
Source: CTPS Study 1984
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Table I is noteworthy because it discloses the relatively modest role
played by feeder buses in providing access to this branch of the Red Line.
Also apparent is the almost nonexistent contribution made by private buses in
providing access to the Red Line on the South Shore. This reduced role is
highly significant because it runs counter to what was projected by planners
when the construction of the South Shore extension was initiated in 1966. At
that time, planners anticipated a Red Line extension where almost half of the
riders would park and ride, and where feeder buses would play the next most
important role. A full 26% of the total ridership was expected to ride MBTA
buses to the new stations. However, this never materialized and at present
only 12% of those using this extension arrive on a bus, an occurrence not yet
satisfactorily explained.
But while the planners were overestimating the number of bus riders,
they were understating the number of people who would be willing to walk to
the Red Line. They projected that only 8 percent of the ridership of the new
line would elect to walk to it. However, three times as many riders chose and
continue to choose this method of gaining access. However, these figures do
not apply to the more recently opened stations on this branch, South Braintree
and Quincy-Adams, where walk-ons are a insignificant factor and the vast
majority of riders arrive in automobiles. Buses also play a minor role among
patrons of these stations who appear to have few alternatives to driving.
Another interesting factor is that the access preference of these Red
Line patrons appears to be relatively unchanged over the years. Most choose
to use private transportation to obtain access to the line or to walk to it when
they can and they have a tendency to stick with the mode chosen. In light of
this, the minor role of the feeder bus system is doubly disturbing because it
may be difficult to convince future riders to access by bus and almost
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impossible to switch established drivers to a bus ride. This may indicate that
future patronage gains will occur only if more cars can be accommodated at
already overcrowded parking lots. The Committee is concerned that the past
inability of this transit district to encourage the growth of a healthy feeder
bus system will retard any significant rider growth on the South Shore branch
of the Red Line.
The northwest extension, in contrast, has a patronage which is much less
likely to use the Red Line after a trip by private passenger car. At Davis
station, 66% of the patrons walk and 21% arrive by bus; at Porter a full 76%
arrive on foot and 13% use a bus. Even at Alewife, the station with the most
affluent riders, less than 50% drive or are driven. And, significantly, 36% use
MBTA buses to gain access, a figure which compares favorably with the 40
percent bus usage prevailing at Quincy Center, the only station on the South
Shore extension with an extensive bus utilization pattern. At Harvard, even
after the opening of the extension to the northwest, almost 30% of those
boarding use a bus to get to the station, while 61% still walk.
As to why people ride the Red Line on week days, there are no
surprises. On the South Shore, the predominant purpose was work-related,
with almost nine out of ten people boarding for that purpose. The other
measurable group of riders was students. Not surprisingly, on the Northwest
corridor side, work or school were also the main reasons for using the line
during the week but the percentage of total riders using it for those purposes
was lower - 70% versus the 90% on the south side. Apparently, the difference
in the two transportation corridors can be accounted for by the somewhat
unique status of the Harvard station. There, the prevalence of academic and
cultural institutions is a factor as is Harvard Square's role as a tourist
attraction. These may generate a significant number of nonwork related trips
during the week.
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While the Committee appears to be confining its remarks to a
description of the South Shore extension and the Cambridge side of the Red
Line at the expense of the Ashmont/Dorchester branches, that limitation is
not deliberate. It is only occurring because, unfortunately, there have been no
recent studies focused on the Dorchester spur of the Red Line. However, it is
clear that those who regularly use the Dorchester branch are more transit
dependent than many of their fellow patrons on the South Shore extension. It
also is true that the vast majority of this branch's patrons walk or use a bus to
gain access to the line. In that respect they are similar to the patrons of the
line who use Harvard, Porter, Davis and Central stations on the northwest side
of the line.
While the ambitious passenger surveys conducted by the Central
Transportation Planning Staff produced few dramatic new revelations, they
contribute measurably to the database on which good planning must proceed.
To the Committee, they also provide the opportunity to reemphasize the
contributions of the Red Line to the overall transportation needs of the
Greater Boston market. For example, while there is a tendency in some host
communities to view the rapid transit line as an intrusive convenience for
nonresidents, the salient fact is that healthy majorities of riders on each
branch of the Red Line do in fact reside in the communities through which the
lines run.
At the same time, the data shows that an increasing number of long
distance commuters can be attracted to such a line, if access is provided and
reasonable service is delivered. Although most Red Line patrons use rapid
transit because of convenience or cost, there is a significant number who
could use their personal vehicle rather than public transportation. Since
choosing public transportation over private vehicles affects Red Line ridership
and roadway congestion, this elasticity of choice has relevance for those who
must use this sometimes beleaguered rapid transit line and for those who
steadfastly choose to commute by car to downtown Boston and its neighboring
communities. This relevance is explored in greater depth in what follows.
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HI. Significance of Red Line to Other Commuters
As one of three rapid transit routes operated by the Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority, the Red Line is an indispensable public facility. Its
importance to the communities located within the travel corridors which it
serves cannot be overstated. It is sometimes forgotten that the Red Line, like
the Orange Line, is a common carrier for thousands of people who travel from
opposite directions to a common destination, and whose homes are sometimes
eighty to a hundred miles apart. Notably, it serves two of the six travel
corridors into which transportation planners have divided the Greater Boston
region. For many living within these two transportation corridors who must
travel to the region's core area, the trip would be more difficult in the
absence of such a transit alternative, even if there were a car available for
the trip. In peak travel times, it would be virtually impossible.
Reference to some of the facts collected in the "1983 Transportation
Plan For The Boston Region" is helpful in making that point clear. Moreover,
reflection on certain of these findings is a worthwhile exercise for those who
choose to travel in private cars to the region's core, which is defined as the
neighborhoods of Boston, Cambridge, Somerville, Brookline, Chelsea and
Everett. For example, in the northwest corridor, which extends from
Cambridge and Somerville northwest to 1-49.5, there are no grade - separated
routes which run directly into downtown Boston after Route 2 reaches Alewife
Brook Parkway. Consequently, a large portion of auto trips to downtown
Boston or the rest of the core from the corridor must pass through
Cambridge's arterials and streets. If some fifty-six percent of the 46,900
person trips to the regional core during the morning peak period were not
being made by public transit, travel for the rest of those making the trip
would be, at best, torturous.
Similar realities are found in the South Shore corridor which contains
Red Line branches to both Braintree and Dorchester. The planners describe
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this corridor as including the Massachusetts Bay coastline from Boston to
Duxbury. (Though the Committee thinks that corridor now extends at least to
the Sagamore Bridge.) It continues to be the fastest growing part of the
region. Even though some of the core-bound travel is served by a major
limited access highway, 1-93, including the part commonly known as the
Southeast Expressway, sixty-two percent of the 57,800 core-oriented trips
during the morning rush hour are completed on the Red Line.
Given the widely documented inadequacies of the existing highway
system, it is unlikely that there will be an appreciable rise in the percentage
of trips to the core region which occur in private vehicles. However, since
Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS) surveys of Red Line patrons
show that many riders of both the north and south extensions have a relatively
low level dependency on public transit systems, there is always the chance
that such riders, if faced with poor or unreliable service, would choose to
commute to or through the central business district of Boston in their cars.
This transference would most likely occur among those with the longest
commute and who board at Braintree, Quincy-Adams, and Alewife.
Two-thirds of those riders report that they use the Red Line "by choice."
Overall, the studies show that a very appreciable percentage of those boarding
both Red Line extensions could drive to work if they chose to do so.
The existence of this relatively large pool of "voluntary" Red Line
patrons should not be overlooked by those who commute to Boston by car in
the affected transportation corridors. Each member of that pool is a
potential competitor for limited highway space, especially during peak travel
times. Should any significant number of these regular "by choice" Red Line
patrons abandon this transportation mode in favor of their cars, the impact
would be felt immediately. Long term abandonment of transit by this
population could seriously disrupt the travel of established highway users.
This disruption can be easily illustrated, even if we assume that only
25% of the "voluntary" pool of South Shore Extension Red Line patrons
suddenly returned to the road. In that event, approximately 2,500 additional
-12-
vehicles would join the northbound morning rush hour. If the influx was
confined to the Southeast Expressway, there would be about a 13% increase in
total rush hour volume, and all of this would occur on a road with an hourly
practical capacity in rush hours which barely reaches 1,600 vehicles per lane.
The increase in new cars would nearly match the northbound volume of both
Dorchester Avenue and Morrisey Boulevard during the present morning rush
hour.
When the significance of the Red Line is approached from this point, it
becomes obvious that a reliable and efficient rapid transit line in these two
transportation corridors deserves a constituency which is not simply limited to
MBTA riders and transportation planners. Self-interest recommends that all
commuters lobby for adequate rapid transit service. In the affected corridors,
there are twice as many people riding the Red Line to work as there are
driving cars, but only half of those who use rapid transit have to do so. These
thousands too could be competing for a space in the lane ahead or for one of
the dwindling parking spaces in the central business district.
-13 -

IV. Red Line Demand and MBTA Ability to Supply Service
A. Demand for Service
According to the 1983 Transportation Plan for the Boston Region,
ridership on public transportation has declined markedly over a twenty-five
year period beginning in the midfifties when almost 1,000,000 trips per day
were provided by public conveyance in the towns and cities which the MBTA
now serves. The early 1970's saw ridership drop to as low as 480,000 trips on
an average weekday. After that there was a slow increase in volume until
fare increases drove patronage back down to the level of the early 1970's. In
November of 1981 the MBTA averaged only 546,000 trips per day, including
35,000 commuter rail trips. This decline in ridership has been of considerable
concern to public officials and transportation planners, almost of all whom see
public transportation as the only rational way to provide a net increase in the
Commonwealth's ability to move people to and around the Greater Boston
area. Fortunately, there are signs that declines of the past have been
reversed.
Authority personnel now estimate that about 700,000 boardings or trips
occur on MBTA facilities on an average weekday. A boarding or a trip is
where a person begins a trip on one of the agency's conveyances after paying
some type of fare and then exits from "T" property. If the person transfers in
route without paying an additional fare, that transfer does not count as a
boarding. If the person returns to the point of origin by again using the
MBTA, that is considered a separate boarding. Thus the fact that the
Authority experiences 700,000 boardings daily should not be interpreted to
mean that almost three quarters of a million individuals use the "T" each
weekday. On the contrary, because most trips taken include a return, it is
more reasonable to conclude that almost 350,000 people use the MBTA on a
typical work day. And although this number is still significantly lower than
that counted in the 1950's, it represents an encouraging 25% increase over the
280,000 estimated as using the system just seven years ago.
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Not surprisingly, the overall growth of ridership noted across the entire
system is also reflected in the ridership figures for the Red Line, although the
exact growth on the Red Line is difficult to measure. Because two stations
serving the Red Line, Washington and Park Street, also serve as entry or
transfer points for other major MBTA lines, daily turnstyle counts cannot be
used to gauge patronage. As a result, actual passenger counts or surveys must
be conducted to obtain a reasonable allocation of usage at these multi-line
stations. Because these are both expensive and difficult to implement, they
are done only periodically, with the last one involving all branches of the Red
Line conducted during October of 1985. Nevertheless, the Committee was
able to use these figures and the 1978 passenger counts for the Red Line to
develop a fairly reliable idea about passenger volume on this line over the last
decade. Table II presents boardings at all Red Line stations for 1978 and 1985.
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JABLEJJ
Red_ Lin^J3oajd^y»J^Sjation
1.9.*f*l12L. <* Vl^kdax
^lik-^Z^ O>mpared^o pc_tqberL1985
Segment by Passenger Count Passenger Count Percentaj
Station _Apj-il,_1978_ October, 1985 Change
Dorchester Branch
Ashmont 10,269 8,500
Shawmut 1,200 1,122
Fields Corner 4,711 4,723
Savin Hill 1,636 1,694
Columbia 4^200 4^200
Subtotal 22,016 20,239 -08%
South Shore Branch
Braintree * 3,688
Quincy-Adams * 3,525
Quincy Center 9,412 6,027
Wollaston 3,614 4,246
North Quincy 4^88 5^469
Subtotal 17,414 22,955 +32%
Red Line Stem
Broadway 3,874 3,606
Andrew
Subtotal
4^7 58
8,632
3^956
7,562 -12%
Northwest Branch
Alewife * 4,762
Davis * 5,057
Porter- * 5,116
Harvard 23,532 17,450
Central 8,737 8,621
Kendall
Subtotal
5,514
37,783
6^943
47,949 +27%
Downtown Boston
Charles 6,654 6,446
Park Street 38,000** 39,500**
Washington 23,457** 25,300**
South Station
Subtotal
9^810
77,921
14,511
%5 f757 +10%
Total Red Line
Boardings 163,766 184,462 +13%
*Not yet opened
*Estimate
Source: CTPS Studies
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While the Committee is aware that there are some seasonal variations in
ridership patterns on the MBTA, it believes that the two months surveyed are
sufficiently similar to allow it to comment on passenger growth on the Red
Line during the period. First, it is obvious that the stations opened on both
the South Shore and Northwest segments after 1978 account for almost all
growth observed on the line. The apparent loss of patronage at the older
stations is not particularly alarming or unexpected. Several surveys have
confirmed the fact that a significant number of established transit riders who
previously boarded at one of the older stations now enters the line at one of
the new stations, a result which was anticipated in the planning stages of both
extensions. The healthy increase in passenger volume noted in both the South
Shore and Northwest branches of the Red Line confirms the prudence of the
significant public investment in such extensions.
The estimated 184,462 boardings noted in the October, 1985 passenger
counts represents a 13% increase over the number observed in 1978 for this
line. Partial counts made in 1986 and 1987 indicate that about another 5%
increase in total Red Line boardings has occurred since the 1985 counts were
made. That means that today, an average of 194,000 boardings occurs on this
important rapid transit line on a typical weekday. And, although the 18%
increase in patronage noted for this line is somewhat lower than experienced
on the total MBTA system, it is still important because it has occurred on an
already heavily used facility. Moreover, it corroborates the observations of
patrons who complain about overcrowding. When they complain that the line
is crowded and is getting more crowded by the day, the patronage figures
confirm this.
§L.DislL^!iti .G_2.LD^lIl§I!l. -Q-^^_LiE1^
If the 194,000 trips generated daily on the Red Line were reasonably
spread out in the operational day, allocating the available equipment
according to the demand would be a less demanding task than it in actuality
is. But, the MBTA, like other transit operators worldwide, must try to cope
with demand that surges and ebbs according to morning and evening rush
hours. This reality is aptly illustrated by Table III.
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TABLE
m
AMJRusJhJjoj^jCojTn^ared
Jo^^Djiy_J^oar_djngs_-
Selected Stations on_R_ed_k*n?
Boardings May, 198*
Boardings Boardings Morning
Soj^^Shore_Exten£ion 6;30am - 9:30am All Day B^i^^LiJour
Braintree 3,100 3,736 83%
Quincy-Adams 1,200 4,575 26%
Quincy Center 2,600 7,194 36%
Wollaston 3,100 3,803 82%
North Quincy 2^500 5^425 46%
TOTALS 12,500 24,733 50%
Boardings October 15, 1986
Northwest Extension
Boardings
6:30am - 9:30am
Boardings
All_Da_y_
Morning
Rush_Hour
Alewife
Davis
Porter
3,116
3,331
2,687
5,573
5,232
5,118
56%
64%
53%
TOTALS 9,134 15,923 57%
Again, unfortunately, the Committee could not obtain similar data for
the Ashmont/Dorchester branch, but there is general agreement that that
segment experiences a morning rush hour of equivalent dimensions to the
other branches of the Red Line. That a similar rush hour also exists in the
evening is undoubted but is not so clearly documented in published reports on
the MBTA. Interviews with operational personnel indicate that the evening
rush hour is more compressed than the morning peak period, with the bulk of
that rush occurring between 4:15p.m. to 6:15p.m., an observation confirmed by
Committee staff when they sampled "T" performance on selective days in
February of 1988.
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An additional factor complicating matters for transportation planners in
this transit system and elsewhere is the fact that about W% of the rush hour
demand will occur within a single one-hour period. This phenomenon places
demands on the system which is almost beyond the ability of operational
personnel to meet in a reasonable manner. The problems of the South Shore
extension illustrate this point. On any given weekday about 6,000 north bound
passengers seek passage on the eight four-car trains scheduled for the
7:30-8:30am period. As a result, each train is carrying about 750 passengers
when it crosses the Neponset River en route to the Red Line stem where
additional passengers board at Andrew and Broadway stations. Many of these
trains will arrive at the first "in-town M station, South Station, with well in
excess of 1,000 patrons, a load factor which most people would describe as
being very crowded. Others would be less charitable and simple describe the
cars as being at "crush" condition.
Regardless of what terms are used to describe some of the conditions met
during the morning and evening rushes, defining or providing passenger
"comfort" remains an elusive goal for rapid transit operators even under the
best of circumstances. The fact is that, even if the demand for Red Line
service was spread evenly over the 231 round trips scheduled each day, about
half of those boarding would still have to stand. Consequently, it may be
unrealistic for the public to expect a seat each time they board a Red Line
train. This is particularly true when "rush hour" realities are being measured.
For the vast majority of the 30,000 north bound patrons of the Red Line
during the morning rush hour, obtaining a seat is improbable simply because
the k7 regularly scheduled trains originating from either Braintree or Ashmont
have only a collective seating capacity of 11,280. For those who board after
the first 2 stations on each branch, finding a seat is almost impossible. For
those seeking to board during the peak hour, finding adequate elbow room
instead of a seat becomes the goal.
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Given the fact that two out of three rush hour patrons must stand when
using the Red Line, timely and reliable service becomes that much more
important to the commuter. What is bearable and reasonably acceptable when
established schedules are being met can become quite unbearable when
stretched out for an additional 10-13 minutes, a fact that is reflected in every
passenger survey conducted by the CTPS. Complaints about the lack of
reliable service on the Red Line are foremost in the minds of those
interviewed. Thus, while crowded trains always elicit significant comment,
the majority of complaints are directed at service and schedules. Even when
the Authority adopts six car service on the Red Line, most rush hour patrons
will still have to stand. Consequently, while the addition of six car service
will undoubtedly improve the comfort factor, "getting there on time" will still
remain the core demand of present and potential riders of this rapid transit
line.
C. Meeting Demand on the Red Line: Adequacy of Revenue Service Fleet
The Red Line revenue service fleet consists of 170 cars including 86
Redbirds (No. 5 cars) which were first placed in service in 1962, 74 Silverbirds
(No.l) purchased from the Pullman Company during 1969 and 1970, and 10 newly
purchased (No.2) cars manufactured in Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada, the
vanguard of a 58 new car procurement. Seating capacity for the No.5 cars is
54 and in "normal" crowded circumstances these cars can handle 146 standees
for a total capacity of 200. In very crowded conditions a No. 5 car can handle
296 passengers, a situation where each standee occupies 1.5 square feet of
space. While the No.l cars have more seats, 64, they can only accommodate
116 standees in a "normal" crowded condition for a total of 200 passengers. In
very crowded conditions the Silverbirds can carry up to 257 passengers. The
new No.2 cars are very comparable to the No.l cars and have similar seating
and load characteristics.
- 20 -
All Red Line rapid transit cars operate as married pairs, i.e., they are
coupled, but the No.l cars can not be paired with the No. 5 cars as they are not
compatible in construction. This lack of interchangeability complicates the
operation of the line in several respects, most importantly in the area of
maintenance, repairs and in deploying the available fleet. Because the cars
operate as married pairs, a defect in a single car affects not one car but both
of the pair. If one car is disabled, in reality two cars are disabled, and this is
quite significant when measuring fleet availability, a matter which will be
examined in more depth later.
All of the Redbirds were rebuilt prior to 1985. In November, 1985, the
MBTA contracted with the General Electric Company to perform a major
overhaul of the Silverbird fleet, and to add certain additional safety,
reliability, and maintenance features. Completion of the $38 million contract
was delayed approximately eight months due to a variety of contractor
managerial, technical and materials issues. In the initial period of the rebuild,
it took General Electric 16 weeks to rebuild the No.l cars. As the work
progressed, performance improved and in the later stages of the contractual
period General Electric took only 9-10 weeks per car to complete the rebuild.
Table IV shows the overhaul delivery schedule.
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September
November
December
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
January
TABLEJV
No.l South Shore Vehicle Overhaul
P^Hy^ej^JSchedule
Cars Completed Total Cars
This
_
Pcr.ytfj- Completed
1985 2 2
1985 2 4
1985 2 6
1986 2 8
1986 2 10
1986 2 12
1986 2 14
1986 2 16
1986 2 18
1986 2 20
1986 2 22
1986 4 26
1986 2 28
1986 4 32
1986 2 34
1987 4 38
1987 4 42
1987 2 44
1987 4 48
1987 4 52
1987 2 54
1987 4 58
1987 58
1987 4 62
1987 4 66
1987 2 68
1987 4 72
1988 2 74
According to the MBTA, the Silverbird South Shore cars were essentially
brought to new car status. Under the contract, all major components were
rebuilt or replaced with new parts. The cars have been structurally reinforced
to accommodate the heavy patronage of the Red Line. The interiors have
been modified to increase capacity and improve pedestrian flow. A safer door
control system and an improved passenger emergency intercom capability
have been added. Finally, car appearance was restored with new interior
panelling and a bright red and white exterior paint color scheme.
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Recognizing the need to expand capacity on the Red Line and to
modernize its fleet of rapid transit cars on this line, the MBTA in 1984
contracted with the Urban Transportation Development Corporation (UTDC)
to manufacture 58 new vehicles at a total cost of approximately $58 million.
The new cars were to be designed, manufactured and partially assembled in
Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada where the highly regarded Blue Line No.4 and
Orange line No. 12 cars were designed and built in 1979-80 by the then owner,
Hawker-Siddelly.
The contract was awarded to UTDC (USA) Inc. of Detroit on April 19,
1984 and contractually the vendor was to have delivered two completed "pilot"
cars to the Authority within twenty-two (22) months after issuance of the
"Notice-To-Proceed" in February, 1986. Unfortunately, the No.2 car
procurement encountered an approximate eighteen (18) month delay, an event
which in no way can be attributed to laxity on the part of MBTA
management. A recitation of some of the difficulties faced by management
in obtaining satisfactory performance of the contact is, in the judgment of the
Committee, worthwhile for it may help others to understand the need for
adequate lead time in fleet replacement decisions.
Even though the vendor had successfully bid on the contract, and had
begun work on three other projects including 126 new subway cars, 52 Light
Rail Vehicles (LRV's) for Toronto, and 50 articulated LRV's for Santa Clara, it
was ill-prepared to fulfill its contracts. Apparently the Thunder Bay Plant
where major portions of the work was to be done had been completely idle due
to a long shut down period in mid-1984 and had only a residual staff of about
eight employees. As a result of this shut down, the UTDC engineering and
design staff was depleted. The MBTA quickly recognized that the company
would require a great deal of assistance to design and build a quality car. In
spite of the timely assistance of the MBTA, including its making staff
available to the contractor, UTDC's understaffed engineering and design group
took three years to produce a complete set of design drawings, an effort
which normally would take only about one year.
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Further complicating the procurement was the sale in September of 1986
of UTDC to the Lavalin Corporation, a company whose primary experience
was in heavy industry, consulting, and construction management. The
organizational and personnel changes which occurred after the Lavalin
Corporation acquisition caused additional delay in the program. Lavalin
managers, new to the manufacturing field, were not immediately able to
provide effective leadership and control of the Thunder Bay Plant. Delays
ensued and the vendor was unable to make good on delivery promises for the
pilot cars on three different occasions: January 9, 1987, April 1, 1987, and June
15, 1987. Finally, the first two cars arrived in August of 1987. Table V
provides the current delivery schedule under this contract.
TABLE V
August 1987
November 1987
December 1987
January 1988
February 1988
March 1988
April 1988
May 1988
June 1988
July 1988
August 1988
Cars Delivered
2
2
2
2
8
8
8
10
8
it
Total Cars
Delivered
2
t
6
8
12
20
28
36
46
54
58
If the Committee had questions about why the Authority was so patient
with its supplier, or why it did not seek to replace it with an American
supplier, they were answered when it was advised that there are no domestic
manufacturers of the types of passenger railcars needed by the MBTA. This
startling situation remains in spite of the healthy demand for such products, a
fact reported in Railway Age, January, 1988. There, the renaissance of a
mode of passenger transportation that "not long ago appeared doomed to
museum status" was documented with a complete recapitulation of who is
buying what from whom.
- 24 -
According to that report, American rail passenger agencies - those
providing intercity, commuter, rapid transit, and light rail service - purchased
a billion dollars of cars in 1987, and have a backlog of another billion dollars of
purchases scheduled for 1988. Moreover, orders are already in sight for more
than 360 additional cars in 1988 and for up to 1,650 more in the following five
years. In spite of the multi-billion dollar procurement plans of transit
authorities here and elsewhere in this country, there are no entrants from the
domestic manufacturing sector, a situation which reduces the leverage transit
officials can apply against foreign suppliers when they fail to meet
contractual deadlines. Other times, however, the delays experienced by a
purchaser are more a function of the complicated procurement rules of the
federal government than intransigence on the part of the foreign suppliers.
For example, as a condition of receiving federal transportation funds,
purchasers must assure that a certain percentage of American parts be used,
or a given percentage of the goods be assembled locally, or that ships of
American registry be used for shipment regardless of the location of the
nearest call of port or the availability of American registered ships at that
port. Meeting these requirements adds significant time and cost to transit
vehicle purchase programs.
In spite of the difficulties faced by the manufacturer, it now appears that
the procurement plans of the Authority will be a reality and all of the No.
2
rail cars will be delivered in 1988.
D. Scheduled Red Line Service and Train Availability
For the past several years the Red Line revenue service fleet of 160 cars
has been expected to provide 220 round trips on a normal weekday. In
addition, during the morning and evening rushes, the scheduled service was
supplemented by another 12 round trips on a "Run As Directed" (RAD) basis,
that is, trains placed in service at the discretion of the dispatcher. To provide
this kind of service, 31 four-car trains are required in the peak period service
time. The 124 cars required for the present schedule is 11% higher than the 112
needed for the 1983 schedule and 20% higher than the 104 cars used for peak
periods during 1981.
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Meeting the peak period vehicle requirement of 124 vehicles has proved to
a formidable task for maintenance and operational staff, particularly during
1986 and 1987, the period when the bulk of the No.l cars were being rebuilt.
That rebuilding program dictated that 12-16 vehicles were out of service
daily. At the same time, up to four vehicles each day had to be held out of
service for routine vehicle inspection and servicing. As a result, the
maximum active fleet on a daily basis ran between 140 and 146 vehicles.
Because of the age of the fleet and its diverse composition, ratios of car
availability to schedule needs ranging from 1.13 to 1.17 provide only razor thin
margins of error. Moreover, this precarious balance between fleet demands
and car availability is made even more acute because all of the cars operate
in tandem pairs. This means that if one of the pair has a serious defect, both
members of the pair must be taken out of service. Thus, on days when only
140 cars are available, there are only 8 pairs of cars available for backup
service.
Despite these equipment limitations, the Authority maintains that its
decision to operate a maximum of 124 cars was required by service demands, a
demand which, it argues, has been met more often than not. To illustrate that
point the Authority has prepared the data found in Table VI. It details Red
Line vehicle availability for the period of January, 1986, through November,
1987, and demonstrates that there was a steady improvement in the number of
vehicles available. The table indicates that for 1986, an average of 123
vehicles was available for peak period service, and in 1987 an average of 125
cars was available for peak period service. It should also be noted that after
August, 1987, there was a noticeable improvement in equipment availability.
While this is encouraging news, the Committee cautions that these results
must be interpreted in light of what happens to the system when the available
equipment is actually pressed into service, and that issue will be explored in
the sections dealing with equipment reliability.
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Adopting a schedule which requires 124 cars during peak periods has
enabled the Authority to run 31 four-car trains in the morning and evening
peak periods on the Red Line. During rush hours, the present schedule calls
for an eight minute headway between trains which are inbound from Braintree
and Ashmont. Under normal circumstances, the Run As Directed (RAD) trains
can reduce the scheduled headway by as much as two minutes. As both
Braintree and Ashmont branches join before the entrance of the subway stem,
the headway prevailing in the subway is reduced correspondingly. Both
Ashmont bound and Braintree bound trains leave Alewife station every eight
minutes during rush hours, but leave alternately so a train heads to Boston at
least every four minutes. The practical minimum headway achieved in the
subway is about two minutes and occurs when trains bunch or encounter
delays. Ninety-six of the 220 daily roundtrips are provided in the peak period,
half in the morning, the other half in the afternoon. Table VII summarizes the
number and distribution of Red Line trains during the week. Tables VIII A and
B record the established weekday schedule for the Red Line segments,
effective December 28, 1987.
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A. Throughput Achievement
As already noted, the management decision to maintain a maximum of
124 passenger cars available for peak period service at a time when the
"Silverbird" fleet was being overhauled put a considerable strain on the
system. Just how successfully management met that challenge can be
assessed in several ways. One way is to measure "throughput," a performance
indicator that counts the actual number of trains that pass a particular
location and compares that figure with the number of trains that was
scheduled to pass the point. The Authority reports that throughput
performance continues to improve and that its Operative Directorate
continues to strive to maintain its goal of a consistent throughput level of
between 98 and 100 percent. The data supplied by the Authority to the
Committee indicates that for the most part that level of performance is being
achieved.
During the critical morning peak period, throughput for Braintree
northbound traffic improved from 95.1 percent in 1985 to 100.7 percent during
1986 and stayed at a very respectable 99.3 percent through 1987. A similar
level of improvement was noted for the Ashmont morning rush hour to
Boston. For the southbound evening rush hour on the Braintree line, there was
an even more impressive gain in throughput performance, which rose from
85.9 percent in 1985 to 103.1 percent in 1987. On the Ashmont line, southbound
evening rush hour traffic had a throughput level of 106.1 percent in 1987, a
healthy increase from the 98.7 percent recorded in 1985. This demonstrated
improvement in throughput performance may indicate that the investment in
an upgraded fleet of rolling stock is beginning to pay off.
However, there is one area where increased performance must occur.
The Committee notes that outbound traffic during the morning rush hour is
still below the expected standard. For instance, during the period August to
November of 1987, outbound traffic during the peak hours of the morning only
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achieved a throughput level of 93.4 percent. This fact is confirmed by Table
IX, a graph provided to the Committee by the Authority. Why this lower level
of performance occurred has not been explained. One possibility may be that
operations personnel pressed into service cars which were only marginally
acceptable. The cars may have made it to Cambridge, but were too fragile to
successfully complete the return journey. In that regard, it is interesting to
note that the overall Red Line evening data is much better than the overall
morning data, 108.2% to 95.6%. The Committee conjectures that the longer
period available to prepare for the afternoon rush hour may be responsible for
the better record achieved during that time frame.
TABLE IX
THROUGHPUT: RED LINE
110
1985
91.6%
PERCENT
1986
96.7
1987 (NOV.)
95.6%
105r
100L
MAMJ JASOND
OVERALL RED LIWE(AM)
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B. Meeting Scheduled Times and Headways
Useful as it may be as a performance measure, throughput data can only
present a static picture of the Authority's ability to deliver the service level
it establishes for itself when it develops and releases its schedules. Relying
on that measure alone is akin to using a handicap sheet which only tells you
how many of the horses that entered the race actually finished the course, but
provides no information on how long it took them to complete the race or
whether anybody was on board at the finish. None of the data provided by the
Authority at the Committee's request allows an examination of the question
as to whether or not the trains actually perform according to the established
timetable. The Committee wanted to know how many trains actually ran
according to the established schedule and if the established headway between
trains was being maintained. Apparently that data is not readily available.
Running according to the established headway means that during rush
hours trains departing Ashmont or Braintree leave at no more than eight
minute intervals. Braintree bound trains leave Alewife station at eight
minute intervals as do Ashmont trains, but the branch trains leave
alternatively with a four minute headway between them. The insertion of Run
As Directed (RAD) trains can reduce the prevailing headway by as much as
two minutes. In the subway part of the Red Line, both branches of the line
share the same tracks and during rush hours the established headway between
trains is frequently reduced to as low as two minutes. During nonrush hour
periods, headway for both Ashmont and Braintree trains is twelve minutes.
While the Committee accepted that the Authority was unable to provide
data on the timeliness issue, it retained its desire to gain some realistic
perspective on the issue. Consequently, it directed its staff to do a limited
field study, somewhat comparable to that conducted by the Advisory Board in
September of 1987, on how effectively the Authority is meeting the demands
of its Red Line schedule. Accordingly, Committee staff monitored morning
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rush hour service from Braintree on February 22nd, from Ashmont on
February 24th, and from Alewife on February 26th. Southbound evening rush
hour service was observed at Park Street and South Station on March 3rd and
at Washington Street and South Station on March 4th. Inclement weather was
a factor only on one day, Friday, February 4, when it snowed heavily during
the evening rush hour.
Staff observations of the morning rush hours were tabulated and are
presented here as Tables X, A, B, and C. For both February 24th and 26th the
data shows that the Authority performed impressively. On those days,
average headway was as established, and running time was as expected. While
on February 24th headway between Ashmont trains at Park Street twice
exceeded the established norm by four minutes, almost all trains left Ashmont
on time and arrived at Park Street on a timely basis. On the 22nd of
February, there were two occasions when headway between Braintree trains
grew to 13 minutes. These trains were two of the four trains which had
running times to Park Street which were at least six minutes longer than
expected under the schedule.
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TABLE X A
Braintree Inbound Performance
AM Rush Hour - February 22, 1988
Scheduled
Departure*
Actual
Departure
Arrived
Park Street
Elapsed
Time - Minutes
6:46 6:46 7:11 25
6:57 6:57 7:22 25
RAD 7:03 7:35 32
7:08 7:10 7:41 31
7:20 7:20 7:48 28
7:28 7:28 7:56 28
7:36 7:40 8:08 28
7:45 7:48 8:22 34
7:53 Canceled/Lack of Equipment
8:01 7:59 8:27 28
8:09 8:06 8:33 27
8:18 8:14 8:46 32
8:26 8:20 8:49 29
8:36 8:28 8:54 26
RAD 8:36 9:09 33
RAD 8:40 9:07 27
8:48 8:48 9:12 24
Additional South Shore RAD trains arrived Park Street at 7:15, 8:03 and 8:18.
Average headway between trains arriving Park Street - 6 minutes.
Largest headway observed at Park Street - 14 minutes.
Average running time to Park Street - 28 minutes.
Longest running time to Park Street - 34 minutes.
Expected running time to Park Street - 26 minutes.
Scheduled headway was eight minutes.
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JABLE_X_B
Ashmont Inbound PCTformance
A^Rush^Ho^- February 2*^1988
Scheduled Actual Arrived Elapsed
Departure Departure Park Street Time - Minutes
6:33 6:32 6:47 15
6:40 6:40 6:56 16
6:48 6:48 7:06 18
6:57 6:57 7:15 18
7:06 7:07 7:25 18
7:15 7:14 7:32 18
7:23 7:24 7:40 16
7:31 7:30 7:51 21
7:39 7:39 7:56 17
7:47 7:47 8:04 17
7:56 7:56 8:13 17
8:04 8:04 8:23 19
8:12 8:12 8:31 19
8:20 8:21 8:43 22
8:30 8:30 8:52 22
8:39 8:38 8:58 20
8:50 8:45 9:05 20
RAD 8:52 9:11 19
9:02 9:01 9:16 15
Average headway between trains at Park Street - 18.2 minutes.
Largest headway between trains at Park Street - 12 minutes.
Average running time to Park Street - 18.4 minutes.
Longest running time to Park Street - 22 minutes.
Expected running time to Park Street was 18-19 minutes.
Scheduled headway was eight minutes.
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TABLE X C
AJewi^J[ntoi^dJP^^omiaiice
AM Rush Hour - February 26, 1988
Scheduled Braintree Bound Ashmont Bound Arrival Elapsed
Departure
_L£.tLAI^wJl?_ Left Alewife Park Street Time - Minutes
7:03 7:05 7:22 17
7:14 7:12 7:33 21
7:17 7:16 7:40 24
* 7:19 7:43 24
7:23 7:22 7:45 23
7:25 7:26 7:51 25
7:31 7:31 7:51 20
7:35 7:35 7:53 18
7:40 7:40 7:57 17
7:44 7:45 8:03 18
7:50 7:50 8:08 18
7:52 7:55 8:12 17
7:58 7:59 8:21 22
8:04 8:02 8:24 22
8:06 8:05 8:27 22
8:08 8:09 8:31 22
* 8:11 8:34 23
8:12 8:13 8:36 23
8:14 8:17 8:39 22
8:20 8:19 8:42 23
8:22 8:22 8:44 22
8:28 8:27 8:47 20
8:31 8:31 8:49 18
8:36 8:37 8:56 19
8:39 8:39 9:04 25
8:42 8:45 9:07 22
8:45 8:47 9:09 22
* S:50 9:12 22
8:50 8:53 9:15 22
8:53 8:57 9:17 20
Average headway between trains at Park Street - 3.5 minutes.
Largest headway observed between trains at Park Street - 7 minutes.
Average running time to Park Street - 20 minutes.
Longest running time to Park Street - 25 minutes.
Expected running time to Park Street - 19/20 minutes.
Scheduled headway between trains leaving station was four minutes.
*Extra Service
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The Southbound evening rush hour period was monitored on March 3rd and
4th not only for schedule adherence purposes, but also to assess passenger load
factors on the trains and platforms to determine how many, if any, patrons
were unable to board a particular train. Observations took place at both Park
Street and South Station on March 3rd. That evening the average headway
between the 35 southbound trains entering Park Street between biOO p.m. and
6:00 p.m. was just over three minutes, a rate well below the headway called
for under the regular schedule. Only two trains were late, one by four
minutes and the other by five minutes. The average dwell time (time to board
passengers) at Park Street and South Station was just over one minute.
Although the platforms became very crowded around 5:00 p.m., all passengers
seeking to board a train were able to gain entrance. While some trains were
very crowded when exiting the station, none appeared to reach "crush" or
"max pack" conditions.
Friday evening, the 4th of March, was the only day when staff monitors
reported weather as a factor. That day it began to snow heavily at the height
of the evening rush hour, but the Red Line was not affected until about 5'A5
p.m., when the public was advised that the Red Line was experiencing some
delays because of inclement weather. The headway between the next two
trains was 10 and 16 minutes respectively, the only time any delays were
observed that evening. Both before and after that period, headway between
trains was at or just below the established norm. Observations were
conducted that evening at Washington and South Station and with the
exception of the noted delays, platforms never became over crowded, nor
were any trains loaded to a "crush" condition. Like other nights and days
monitored, the public was continually advised of track conditions through a
reasonably functioning public address system.
The Committee acknowledges that the limited survey conducted by its
staff can hardly be conclusive in its assessment of the efficiency of the Red
Line. Nevertheless, it believes that the relatively positive results reported by
its staff are just as worthy of publication as those by others whose
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interpretation of line performance has been reported more negatively
elsewhere. That said, the Committee tempers that observation by noting that
the level of performance achieved on the survey days is not always achieved
by Red Line operations, a fact which is conceded by the Authority officers
who point out the steadily improving performance record of the line in the
last several years. And, the Committee also notes that the effect of any
delays during a rush hour can be subjectively much more negative than time
factors alone convey. When delays did occur, staff observed that waiting
platforms became uncomfortably crowded within just a few minutes and there
was a residual back-up of passengers for the remaining rush period.
C. Reliability of Red Line Passenger Cars
In spite of alleged improvements in Red Line service, public perception of
its reliability remains doubtful or divided. For example, a CTPS study
released in December, 1987, part of which compared attitudes of Alewife and
South Shore riders, indicated that less than k0% of South Shore riders felt that
the service they receive is "adequate." Thus while "throughput" data does
indicate that matters are improving, those who use the service seem to have a
different opinion on that issue. It may well be that public perception of Red
Line adequacy is disproportionately affected by the 5% to 10% of trips which
are interrupted or delayed because of manpower or equipment deficiencies.
But these are legitimate reasons for public concern. Being on time for work,
or to court, or for an important business meeting even ninety percent of the
time is not generally accepted in private industry as justification for missing
appointments or being late the other 10% of the time. And that is the heart of
the MBTA's problem and why the adequacy and reliability of the Red Line
rolling stock is a priority concern of this Committee.
To develop a clearer picture of just how reliably the line performs over a
period of time, the Committee sought and received data that goes beyond
throughput performance. The Committee wanted to know how many
scheduled runs were cancelled or were interrupted after they were
dispatched. The Committee was most interested in learning whether the rate
of improvement noted between 1986 and prior years was also being carried
forward through 1987. Therefore it asked that the data cover the most recent
2 years. The Committee was mindful of the fact that as 1987 progressed, an
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increasingly larger percentage of the Silverbird fleet rebuild program was
completed. For instance, in January of 1987, thirty-eight of the 7k cars had
been completed and by November, 68 of the cars had been fully restored. The
later figure dwarfs the 18 that were restored by June of 1976 and the
Committee wanted to determine if the number of service interruptions
continued to drop as the revenue service fleet was restored.
Responding to the Committee's inquiry, the Authority presented data for
the period January, 1986 to November, 1987, showing the number of scheduled
trips not run and the number of trains taken out of service due to equipment
failure. Table XI summarizes by month the number of trip cancellations by
reason. Three of the categories, no equipment, manpower, and disabled
trains, are self evident. Route delay, the fourth category, is a general
category which includes delays due to weather, train bunching, or switch and
signal problems, but which does not include vehicle or manpower problems.
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TABLEX1
Summjr^of^pail^_^£vice^^ports
Red^ine
TrJ2s_No£R^n_^_Reason
Calendar Year 1986
No No Disabled Route
Month Equipment Manpower Train Delay_ Total
January 112.5 26.5 55.5 43.5 238
February 129 »1 38.5 46.5 255
March 114 33 34.5 68 249.5
April 107 28 48 18 201
May 92.5 66.5 31.5 19.5 210
June 85 31 19.5 11 146.5
July 99 46 27 25 197
August 76 75 17.5 29.5 198
September 88 23 24 15 150
October 108.5 15.5 29.5 5 158.5
November 82.5 11 27 27.5 148
December 77 27 26.5 30 160.5
TOTAL 1171 423.5 379 338.5 2312
Calendar Year 1987
No No Disabled Route
Mo_nth Equipment Manpower Train Delay Totaj
January 104 21 46 69 240
February 85 16 37 40.5 178.5
March 85 32 25.5 25.5 168
April 103.5 25 48.5 27 204
May 86 39.5 32 19.5 177
June 101 43 43.5 46 233.5
July 89 59.5 37 63 248.5
August 72.5 26.5 35 61 195
September 88 47.5 51 36 222.5
October 71.5 40 46 27 184.5
November 46 40 30 36.5 152.5
December _ _ _ _ _
TOTAL 931.5 390 431.5 451 2204
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When the Committee compared the first eleven months of 1986 to the
first eleven months of 1987, it discovered that overall there was a slight
increase in the number of trip cancellations. Moreover, while the number of
trip cancellations due to lack of equipment decreased 15%, the number of
cancellations caused by equipment failure en route increased 22 percent.
These results are tabulated in Table XII.
JABLE_Xn
Cqmj^^nj>JJ98^and^l987
Trip Cancellation By Reason
No No Disabled Route
Year Equipment M§:QE9.^£L Train Q£.!§.Y. Total
1986 1,094 396 353 308 2,151
1987 931 390 431 451 2,203
Percentage
Change -15% -1% +22% +46% +2.5%
While acknowledging that 96.2% of the trips scheduled for 1987 were
completed, a slight improvement over the 96% rate in 1986, the Committee
was concerned that the number of trip cancellations due to equipment failure
went up in a period when the Silverbird fleet was supposed to be in better
shape. In that regard, the Committee points out that during September,
October and November of 1986, only 80 trips were cancelled because of
disabled trains, yet in the same three months of 1987, disabled trains
eliminated 132 scheduled trips, a 65% increase in a period when there were 30
more rebuilt trains available.
Just as important as knowing the number of trip cancellations that occur
is determining when the cancellations occur. Any trip cancellation is
inconvenient, but there is little argument that one which occurs at the
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height of the rush hour has a much greater ripple effect on the system than
one that occurs during off peak hours. Unfortunately, a timetable of trip
cancellations was not available for review. However, the Authority did
provide to the Committee a summary of trains taken out of service due to
equipment failure, tabulated according to rush hours and daily totals. While a
train taken out of service does not necessarily mean that a trig was cancelled
or even delayed, the data on trains taken out of service does give the only
available measure of potential or likely disruptions that can be specifically
related to rush hour travel. The breakdown of this measures, covering the
period January 1986 through November 1987, is presented as Table XIII.
table xiii
SUMMARY OF DAILY SERVICE REPORTS
RED LINE
TRIPS NOT RUN BY REASON
CALENDAR YEAR 1986
MONTH NO EQUIPMENT NO MANPOWER DISABLED TRAIN ROUTE DELAY TOTAL
JANUARY 112.5 26.5 55.5 43.5 238
FEBRUARY 129 41 38.5 46.5 255
MARCH 114 33 34.5 68 249.5
APRIL 107 28 48 18 201
MAY 92.5 66.5 31.5 19.5 210
JUNE 85 31 19.5 11 146.5
JULY 99 46 27 25 197
AUGUST 76 75 17.5 29.5 198
SEPTEMBER 80 23 24 15 150
OCTOBER 108.5 15.5 29.5 5 158.5
NOVEMBER 82.5 11 27 27.5 148
DECEMBER 77 27 26.5 30 160.5
TOTAL: 1171 423.3 379 338.5 2312
CALENDAR YEAR
, 1987
MONTH NO EQUIPMENT NO MANPOWER DISABLED TRAIN ROUTE DELAY TOTAL
JANUARY 104 21 46 69 240
FEBRUARY 85 16 37 40.5 178.5
MARCH 85 32 25.5 25.5 168
APRIL 103.5 25 40.5 27 204
MAY 86 39.5 32 19.5 177
JUNE 101 43 43.5 46 233.5
JULY 89 59.5 37 63 240.5
AUCUST 72.5 26.5 35 61 195
SEPTEMBER 88 47.5 51 36 222.5
OCTOBER 71.5 40 46 27 184.5
NOVEMBER 46 40 30 36.5 152.5
DECEMBER
TOTAL
l
931.5 390 431.5 451 22U4
- to -
A perusal of that table indicates that at least fifty percent of the trains
taken out of service became disabled during the six peak hours of demand.
The Committee also discovered that when the seven month period, May to
November, 1986 was compared to the same period during 1987, the number of
trains disabled during the rush hours rose from 625 to 682, an increase of 9%.
This means that 7% of the 9,461 trains scheduled for rush hour service in the
seven months of 1987 reviewed had to be taken out of service because of
mechanical problems (Tables XIV A and B). However, the Committee does
find a ray of hope in the November, 1987 results, for only 60 of the 2,104 trains
deployed during rush hours that month had to be taken out of service. This
computes to a rate of less than 3%, and suggests that improved maintenance
and a growing fleet of new or rebuilt cars may be able to turn this line around.
TABLE XIV A
Trains Taken Out of Service/Peak Period
Mja^^J^ov^mbej-j_I986
AM Peak PM Peak Total
North 6:30 -L9r30_AM 3:30_^6:30_PM Peak Period
May 47 52 99
June 35 36 71
July 51 53 104
August 49 49 98
September 29 46 75
October 47 42 89
November 49 40 89
TOTAL taken O/S 307 318 625
Total trains
scheduled/period 4,730 4,730 9,460
Percentage taken
out of service 6.5% 6.7% 6.6%
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TABLE XIV B
Trains JTaken Out _ofJ^rvice/Peak _Period
Ma^^J^ovember^1987
AM Peak PM Peak Total
North 6;30-L9J0_AM 3:30 -6:30 PM Peak Period
May 38 68 106
June 52 60 112
July 62 57 119
August 51 45 96
September 49 49 98
October H7 44 91
November
TOTAL taken O/S
30
329
30
353
60
682
Total trains
scheduled/period 4,730 4,730 9,460
Percentage taken
out of service 6.9% 7.5% 7.2%
D. Effectiveness of Preventative Maintenance Program
The encouragingly lower breakdown rate observed during November, 1987
presents an opportune occasion for the Committee to review the effectiveness
of the relatively new preventative maintenance program which MBTA
management initiated in 1986. The Committee is convinced that preventative
maintenance is the key to continued improvement of the Red Line record.
The Committee also believes that with the completion of the Silverbird
rebuild program and the steady arrival of the new No. 2 cars, strict adherence
to the maintenance program is achievable. In the Committee's opinion, the
rebuilt Silverbirds should require far fewer nonscheduled repairs than were
required in the past. Consequently, the Authority should have more resources
available for scheduled maintenance.
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The validity of the Committee belief that the rebuilt Silverbird fleet will
require far fewer "corrective" repairs is attested to by documentation
provided during the audit. The Authority reports that during 3anuary-March
1987, the worst winter months, the net availability of that fleet was 92%-94%,
an exceptionally high availability rate. This finding was part of an analysis
which compared rebuilt No.l cars to No.l cars still awaiting rebuild. Prompted
by management's desire to determine the effectiveness of the investment
being made on the Silverbird fleet, the analysis took place during the six
month period from October, 1986 to March, 1987. This period bracketed the
midpoint of the rebuild program, a time when approximately equal numbers of
rebuilt and unrebuilt cars were in service. It also included the winter season
which imposes the most severe conditions on equipment performance.
Corrective maintenance, which includes repairs to equipment which failed
while in service or was found to have defects upon routine inspection, was
deemed the best measure for comparing performance of the two classes of
cars. As the Committee agrees that corrective maintenance is a relevant
performance measure, it took particular note of the results of that analysis,
and was impressed. For the six month period studied, the unrebuilt cars
experienced 75% more corrective repairs than did those which had been
rebuilt. When the repairs needed are categorized into ten major systems, as is
done in Table XV, the rebuilt cars outperformed the others cars in 9 out of 10
categories. Only the need for electrical system repairs remained unchanged.
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TABLE XV
Companson_of_SiJv^bkdjrram^
Repairs
System Unrebuilt Rebuilt Percent Difference
Air 108 52 108 %
Brakes 66 43 53
Carbody 81 38 113
Doors 92 67 37
Electrical 65 67 (3)
Heating, Ventilation
and Air Conditioning 66 32 106
Couplers and Draft
Gear 53 14 279
Propulsion 155 82 89
Trucks 66 22 200
Automatic Train
Control 73 54 35
OVERALL 825 471 75 %
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Another factor evidencing the success of the Silverbird rebuild program is
the steady reduction in the number of warrantable repair jobs which had to be
performed on the rebuilt cars. In March, 1986 warrantable maintenance
(repair work and retrofits directly related to the contract work) averaged 8.5
repairs per car per month. During the next twelve months, warrantable
maintenance averaged two repairs per car per month, a 76% reduction.
The relatively positive outcomes of these performance measures do
provide some basis for optimism about this transit line's future. Yet, at the
same time, they also illustrate that even recently rebuilt equipment suffers
breakdowns which require corrective repairs, a reality which a good
preventative maintenance program is designed to minimize. Whether the
Authority is taking seriously its responsibility to maintain its substantially
upgraded stock of Red Line vehicles is of considerable interest to the
Committee.
Responding to the Committee's concern, the Authority emphasized a
number of points. It noted that for the past two fiscal years the Red Line has
engaged in an increasingly aggressive preventative maintenance program. It
concedes that prior to that time, preventative maintenance was confined to
activities associated with mileage inspections. Emphasis has now shifted from
breakdown maintenance to maintenance based on manufacturer
recommendations, managerial experience and past service history. At
present, the maintenance program operates on the theory that it is better to
replace an item subject to wear and tear on an established time table, rather
than wait for it to break.
In preparing the Red Line maintenance budget, the heavy rail managers
try to strike a balance between funding so low that the maintenance program
fails and "gold plating." As a practice, slightly more work is scheduled than
can be accomplished. According to the Authority, this approach serves two
purposes: carhouse employees are challenged to peak output, and resources
can be shifted to deal with unexpected problems without disastrous results.
The Red Line preventative maintenance program accomplishments for fiscal
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years 1986 and 1987 is presented in Table XVI. While the data
presented
indicates that the majority of line items were accomplished as projected,
some were not. Several incompletions, the Authority advises,
were the result
of mid-year changes. One category, mileage inspections, had a
variation
because a decision was made to increase the number of miles between
inspections from 5,000 to 7,500 miles. As a result the number of inspections
required dropped, but the budget figure was not changed, giving the
false
impression that there was a 17 percentage shortfall when there was in fact
none. Some of the annual programs were not completed because they
were
absorbed in the rebuild program. Others were not accomplished because
the
labor was not available.
TABLE XVI
Summary of Red Line
Maintenance Program
Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987
1UXRAM TITLE
Fine x op nn; % IN-
A. JJEITXTIUIS rumen anvLF.mj TU1AL VUiWi CUITJUID TUITU.
1. MLEACE INSP. 1352 1250 93* 1550 1206 837.
2. ato inspections 135 105 78* 160 LOO 637.
3. iifatin: VQirUAIlN; 320 436 842 750 730 100%
AIR cutuir IHSP.
n. atujal ncaws
4. BATDU CTCLE 160 160 100% 160 136 057.
5. AIR OUtIP SERV. 9'. 94 10UZ 92 92 10U7.
6. CEAR UNIT SERV. 160 160 10CK 160 160 wufc
7. AXLE TESr UUWASUUC 160 160 100% 160 128 0U7.
8. CAR 1KATER SERV. 86 02 95* 86 70 017.
9. AXLE DHUSIl SERV. 116 44 30% 116 116 1UU%
10. TRACT IUI WIOR LUBE 160 160 woe 160 160 IU07.
11. WINDSHIELD WirER RETL. O .•
12. UIDER CAR S1EAH aEAMUU 74 30 51% 160 134 84%
c. luuLFicraiui mopjwB
13. h> lunui bistauatiui 62 62 100% 24 13 5'.7.
14. FLOOR IFAT OUNIAClUa 06 U7. 86 0%
15. p.v.c. ruo. 40 40 1007.
16. PUBLIC AI)U(ESS BUIIUJ 06 06 1007.
17. Aiu mviz swnui 06 06 IUU%
D. ovehiaul itcuwg
18. CAB UFATTR 82 4 5% 70 70 1U07.
19. C.I). EJF.ra;. VALVE 50 50 1007. 20 20 1UU7.
20. IEVELIIi; VALVE TEST 160 144 90% 10 10 iur.
21. A & R VALVE 00 50 6a 27 27 1UU%
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The Authority admits that in the past cars with deferred maintenance
were released from the carhouse for revenue service. The Authority now
acknowledges that returning marginal equipment to service can have an
adverse impact on fleet reliability. This is a practice which the Authority
indicates will stop in the immediate future. It promises that as more No.
2
South Shore cars become available for service, older cars will not be released
until scheduled work is completed. The Committee believes that this is an
important policy and should be adhered to, even if it means that the number
of six-car trains which can be deployed is somewhat delayed or reduced. The
Committee recognizes that the addition of six-car trains to the Red Line peak
period is a good and cherished goal of management, but admonishes that it
should not be sought at the expense of fleet reliability.
In making this observation the Committee reminds the Authority that it
will take four to five years to overcome the years of deferred maintenance
endured by the Red Line. Moreover, the Red Line Vehicle Maintenance
Department estimates that "the Red Line is about 50% of the way to enjoying
the desired level of reliability brought on by good preventative maintenance."
The Committee hopes these facts are carefully weighed as the six-train
program becomes a reality. If it is not, the Committee is fearful that the
Authority may simply find itself struggling to nurse out of service a number of
six-car instead of four-car trains.
-51-
YkABiyTX9f_RJ^LLN^IO_MEJiX
A. MBTA Investment in Red Line Facilities
As this performance review progressed, the future capabilities of this
vital rapid transit line remained a major question. This does not mean that
the present performance of the line was not of interest to the Committee.
Rather, the future of the Red Line retained its prominence because the Red
Line is viewed by state transportation planners as a major potential relief
valve for traffic congestion engendered by the construction of the planned
Third Harbor Tunnel/Central Artery Project. Therefore, realistically
evaluating Red Line potential is very much in the public interest. The MBTA
has invested substantial sums to rebuild the Red Line (Table XVII) with the
goal of assuring its future reliability and serviceability.
JABLE_XVn
In Red Line
Imj?£9J£ejr^ent Amount
Rebuilding of Silverbird
(No.l Cars) Fleet
Purchase of 58 UTDC
(No.2 ) Cars
Red Line Extension
(Harvard to Alewife)
Track Replacement
(Charles to Harvard)
Track Replacement
(Charles to Andrew)
Station Modernization
Program
Total Improvement
$38,000,000
42,635, 000
572,000,000
20,000,000
27 t000 f000
_6^000,000
$763,635,000
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Most of the improvements listed in Table XVII have been completed. Ten
of the new No.2 passenger cars are already in service and the rest of the 58
car fleet will be delivered during the year. Station platforms from Central to
Andrew have been extended to accommodate six-car trains. All but South
Station and Broadway have been modernized and completion of those stations
is expected soon. Track rebuilding from Harvard to the Longfellow Bridge
was completed in 1986. The track section rebuilding from Longfellow Bridge
to the Andrew portal is in process and is expected to be finished by the end of
1989.
The MBTA continues to try to ensure that its Automatic Train Control
System is working properly, a system which has caused disruption and delays
in the past. The Authority, while it is not satisfied with the performance of
the overall signal system, maintains that delays due to signal problems have
been reduced. That may be so, but the Committee notes that trip
cancellations because of "Route Delays," a category which includes signal
problems, increased during 1987. The Committee is unable, however, to state
whether signal problems contributed to the increase. The Committee was
pleased to learn that the ambitious Systemwide Power Improvement Project
includes six Red Line traction power substations, four of which have been
completed. These will provide sufficient power to permit the operation of
six-car trains.
B. Six-Car Train Operation in Peak Periods
The major service improvement on the Red Line will be completed when
the remainder of the 58 No.2 cars are delivered and are accepted into revenue
service. At that time the Red Line fleet will consist of 7k No.l cars, 58 No.2
cars, and 86 No.5 cars for a total of 218 cars. With that complement of cars
the Authority expects, by January of 1989, to specify six-car train operation
for the entire peak period of the schedule. To achieve that ambitious goal,
174 vehicles will have to be ready for operation. At that level of service there
will be a surplus of M Red Line cars, a level which management believes will
be large enough to provide back up for both breakdowns and scheduled
maintenance. The ratio of cars available to cars needed will be 1:25. That
ratio, when compared to the 1.16 ratio under the four-car train peak period
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schedule is only 9% higher. The Committee realizes that the quality of the
Red Line fleet will be much better than that available in recent years, but
this only marginally better projected ratio does give it concern about the
ability of the Authority to meet its six-car schedule.
If the Authority is able to successfully implement its full schedule of
six-car trains on the Red Line, it will increase its passenger carrying capacity
by fifty percent during the rush hours. This will be a significant service
improvement and should be reflected almost immediately in the comfort and
convenience of existing patrons. For example, the number of seats available
during the three hour morning rush will expand from 11,280 to 17,000 and each
train will able to carry 1,200 "moderately" crowded patrons. Today, that could
only be accomplished under "crush" load conditions.
The scheduling of six-car trains will also mean that there will be
sufficient capacity to accommodate the 40% of the rush hour population
which seeks service during the "peak" hour of the rush. If the schedule is
maintained as planned, it is unlikely that any patrons will be unable to board
trains, an annoying situation which has happened frequently in the past.
Moreover, under moderately crowded conditions, the 48 six-car trips that will
be regularly scheduled during each peak period will have the potential to
transport about 58,000 people each way on the Red Line. In very crowded
conditions, a maximum of 74,300 passengers could be accommodated each
way. As these figures substantially exceed present Red Line demand during
these hours, it is obvious that the Red Line will be able to accommodate a
significant number of new patrons in the near future.
On the South Shore branch, that part of the Red Line affected most by
the planned Third Harbor Tunnel/Central Artery Project, the introduction of a
full complement of six-car trains will offer equivalent improvements. The
operation of 22 six-car regularly scheduled trains and six Run-As-Directed
trains on this branch during rush hour will increase the branch's
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moderately crowded capacity from 22,000 patrons to 33,600, a level which is
more than sufficient to accommodate any sudden growth in volume. Even
during the peak period, the time when about 6,000 inbound South Shore
patrons seek service during a single hour, six-car trains will provide
immediate relief. The eight six-car trains regularly scheduled for that period,
when supplemented by two RAD trains, will have a capacity to transport up to
12,000 people without undue crowding. Thus, if this schedule can be
accomplished, present patrons on this branch will, at the very least, have
sufficient elbow room to read the morning paper. Almost half of them may be
lucky enough to find seats.
C. Parking Capacity and Growth of Red Line Volume
With this evident and substantial increase in carrying capacity, the
Authority does have the potential to absorb a significant number of South
Shore corridor motorists who choose or are forced to abandon the Southeast
Expressway during the peak construction period of the downtown Boston
highway projects. However, the Committee is concerned that that excess
capacity may never be utilized because of the lack of adequate parking for or
other station access by potential Red Line patrons.
The Committee's concern about Red Line parking availability is well
founded. Although the MBTA has an active program to identify, design and
construct additional parking capacity throughout the system, it is faced with
the reality that with the exception of the Alewife garage, which operates at a
90% utilization rate, all the parking facilities serving the line are at capacity,
many of them before the end of the morning rush hour. Table XVIII, based on
information supplied by the Authority, identifies existing capacity and shows
recent average utilization figures. Clearly, if any appreciable number of
motorists are to be siphoned off already crowded roads to the Red Line,
additional parking facilities must be secured.
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TABLE XVIII
Red_ Line Parking/Weekday Usage
Location
Braintree
Cap_acit^ l\*}l2_l?3Z
1137 1211
Quincy Adams 2077
Au&ust,_1987 2 Month Avg.
1284 1248
2011 2136 2074
Quincy Center 872 681 746 714
Wollaston 522 584 594 589
North Quincy
(Hancock St) 818 770 844 807
North Quincy
(Newport Ave.) 371 360 381 371
Alewife**
Total
2209
8,006
2089 2077 2083
7,886
*Exceeds capacity because of turnover and/or illegally parked vehicles.
**Alewife passenger counts are for October, 1987 and November 1987.
The Authority recognizes this need and has contracted with the LEA
Group to perform site evaluations and determine the feasibility of expanding
parking at all locations along the Red Line. Specific tasks include, among
others, a design for expanding the Quincy-Adams garage to 3,077 spaces and
determining whether it is now possible to increase parking capacity at the
Braintree garage, which was constructed to accommodate an additional two
floors. The Wollaston and North Quincy facilities will also be reviewed to
evaluate the possibility of constructing elevated decks at those sites. The
Authority is also investigating other sites with proximity to the Red Line and
the further development of feeder bus and fringe parking strategies.
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An ideal beginning for Authority Red Line parking expansion efforts
would be the successful expansion of the Braintree and Quincy-Adams
stations. Because these sites offer direct access for highway travellers, use
of local roads and facilities is minimized. Moreover, almost half of the riders
of the South Shore branch are residents of the host communities and thus
would be major beneficiaries of the costly improvement. If Authority plans
are to be meaningful, however, the cooperation of local residents,
communities and elected officials must be secured now. Those efforts must
move beyond the planning stage soon, for, as the MBTA surely knows, five
years is a very short period for seeing even modest public projects
implemented.
D. Conclusion
Over the past several years the Authority has made substantial progress
in improving the physical facilities of the Red Line. Achieving this improved
status was made more difficult because of the years of neglect that preceded
that effort. For a considerable time, the past failure to properly maintain and
replace the line's tracks, signals and rolling stock seriously threatened the
ability of present management to provide adequate and convenient service to
tens of thousands of Red Line patrons. That unacceptable state of affairs
should not be allowed to occur again and the Committee is relying on the
Authority's publicly announced determination to provide adequate service now
and to plan for the future in an acceptable manner.
However, the documented deficiencies of the past prompt the Committee
to underscore the central role that preventative maintenance must play in the
future of the Red Line. In the Committee's judgment, reliability of the
passenger car fleet is key to restoring public confidence in the Red Line.
Timely and reliable service is foremost in the minds of transit riders and it
will make little difference to them whether four or six-car trains are in
operation if the Red Line should continue to experience breakdowns. For that
reason, the Committee urges the Authority to exercise caution as it seeks to
expand its six-car operation. To try to achieve that goal at the expense of
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scheduled maintenance or adequate repair work would signal a return to the
errors of the past. At the same time, the Committee notes that the No.5 cars
may be approaching the end of their useful lives and believes that many of
these need replacement in the near future. This is clear from the fact that
almost three-fourths of train breakdowns are attributed to these cars.
Because of that, the Committee is pleased to learn that the Authority is
already drafting preliminary plans to replace the No. 5 cars, but exhorts the
agency to intensify its efforts. Given the difficulties encountered in the
procurement of the new No. 2 cars, now is hardly too soon to begin replacing
the oldest and most vulnerable part of the Red Line fleet. With these
admonitions in mind, the Committee acknowledges the sincere efforts of the
management and staff of the Authority as the restoration of the Red Line
rapid transit line becomes a reality.
-58-


x,lr
I
Iflfl
'it I
*
